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Abstract
This article oﬀers a new perspective for research on opinion dynamics. It demonstrates the impor-
tance of the distinction of opinion and attitude, which originally has been discussed in literature
on consumer behaviour. As opinions are verbalised attitudes not only biases in interpretation
and adoption processes have to be considered but also verbalisation biases should be addressed.
Such biases can be caused by language deﬁcits or social norms. The model presented in this
article captures the basic features of common opinion dynamic models and additionally biases in
the verbalisation process. Further, the article gives a ﬁrst analysis of this model and shows that
precision as bias in the verbalisation process can inﬂuence the dynamics signiﬁcantly. Presenting
and applying the concept of area of inﬂuential attitudes the impact of each parameter (selective
attitude, selective interpretation, and precision) is analysed independently. Some preliminary
results for combined eﬀects are presented.
Keywords: Opinion dynamics, attitude dynamics, verbalisation, selective attitude, selective
interpretation, area of inﬂuential attitudes
1 Introduction
Consider a group of interacting individuals, e.g. researchers, each having a more or
less positive attitude towards an object, e.g. universities. While the individuals talk
about universities they may formulate their attitude, thus give their opinion. Because the
1individuals are not that narrow-minded, the other individuals’ opinions may inﬂuence
the own attitude. This causes a group-wide attitude and opinion formation process.
Models about opinion dynamics are concerned with the patterns that are built by such
formation processes. The models aim to explain what drives the tendency to polarization
or convergence of opinions or generally what drives speciﬁc fragmentation patterns of
opinions. Beside mathematical proofs (e.g. Hegselmann and Krause 2002) simulation is
applied as a powerful tool to explore properties of complex opinion dynamic models.
Models of opinion dynamics frequently focus on the communication between individuals
as the source for changes of opinions. The impact of other’s opinions on the own one
depends on factors like source of the opinion and diﬀerences between an agent’s own
and the perceived opinion (e.g. Deﬀuant 2001). Despite dealing with cognitive biases
during perceptual processes many articles do not explicitly address the process of opinion
formulation (e.g. Weisbuch et al. 2001, Hegselmann and Krause 2002, Deﬀuant et al.
2000, Deﬀuant 2001, and Holyst et al. 2001). An opinion is a verbalised attitude and
the process of verbalizing an attitude can cause a bias, but the cited articles assume
that the opinion is exactly the same as the attitude. This is the reason why many texts
in opinion dynamics contrary to texts in marketing theory do not distinguish between
attitudes that are at the beginning of the opinion formulation process and opinions
that are at the end (Trommsdorﬀ 1998). This lack of attention towards verbalisation
processes leads to models based on the assumption that individuals can communicate
the diﬀerence between an attitude of 0.5555 and 0.5556. It seems reasonable that during
personal language-based communication between individuals such a high precision is not
applied, therefore the assumption of inﬁnite precision seems to be inappropriate. At the
point of assuming ﬁnite precision we switch from continuous to discrete opinions, which
can change the obtained results dramatically (Hegselmann and Flache 1998). But we
do not switch completely because we assume continuous attitudes within the agents but
allow communication only via discrete opinions. This article rebuilds a basic model of
continuous opinion dynamics, which can be found in Deﬀuant et al. (2001) and Weisbuch
et al. (2001) and rephrases it in the light of consumer behaviour theory. We try to verify
the core results assuming restrictions for the verbalisation of attitudes.
Following this introduction section 2 introduces the diﬀerence between attitude and
opinion. Based on attitude and opinion it presents basic concepts of biases in perceptual
and verbalisation processes. Section 3 presents a formal model covering most of the
biases explained before. The model has four essential parameters: number of individuals,
selective attention, selective interpretation, and precision of opinions. Section 4 analyses
changes to three of the four parameters. The article closes with a summary and an
outlook to future research.
2 Basic concepts
Models of opinion dynamics aim to identify major forces of speciﬁc patterns of opinion
evolution within a society. In case of consumers as individuals such processes are also
elements of marketing research, in particular innovation diﬀusion research. Therefore,
2models of opinion dynamics are a vital part of several articles on innovation diﬀusion
(e.g. Deﬀuant 2001, Chattoe and Gilbert 1999). In marketing theory changes of opinions
are usually modelled as a result of personal experiences, social inﬂuences or cognitive
eﬀorts, i.e. reasoning about signals related to the object the opinion refers to (Fishbein
and Ajzen 1975, Kroeber-Riel and Weinberg 1999, Shet et al. 1999). Models related to
opinion dynamics frequently emphasize communication enabling a mutual, sometimes
one-sided, exchange of opinions as the most important source for opinion formation.
To make these models more compatible with marketing concepts this section links the
term opinion to attitude and identiﬁes four processes that are the foundation of a basic
communication model.
2.1 Communication of attitudes
Attitudes (mental attitudes1) refer to cognitive states of individuals. These states are
characterised by a learned predisposition to respond in a consistently favourable or
unfavourable manner with respect to a given object (see Fishbein and Ajzen 1975, p. 6
and Shet et al. 1999, p. 388). Due to the actual context or due to a lack of individual
abilities an individual’s behaviour does not need to be is consistent with his or her
attitudes. Despite that, in marketing theory, attitude is frequently used as a concept
guiding an individual’s behaviour.
According to Trommsdorﬀ (1998), opinions are verbalised attitudes. Although it might
be counterintuitive at the ﬁrst glance, this conceptualisation meets the idea that attitudes
are expressed by behaviour and observable by others but opinions are usually expressed
by words2. An attitude verbalisation process gives the relation between attitudes that
are internal states and opinions that are expressions able to be communicated via a
communication channel.
As innovation diﬀusion models (and consumer behaviour models in general) aim to pre-
dict behaviour, attitude is the more interesting concept. Because changes in attitudes
are frequently modelled as caused by communication, opinions become relevant as well.
Therefore we want to extend classic opinion dynamic models by introducing a verbali-
sation process. That means we want to anticipate the diﬀerence of attitude and opinion
(as they are interpreted in this article).
We start with a simple attitude communication model that anticipates the diﬀerence of
attitude and opinion (see Figure 1). A communication process connects a sender with a
receiver. This is done by a message that goes through a communication channel that is
controlled by the environment. Four processes can be identiﬁed as most important. First,
the attitude verbalisation process verbalises the sender’s attitude towards an object.
This process converts the cognitive state into an expression able to be communicated
1The Oxford Dictionary gives three meanings of the word attitude: (1) a way of thinking about
something, (2) a way of behaving towards something, or (3) a position of the body (Hornby 1997). We
use the word attitude with the meaning of mental attitude, thus follow the ﬁrst interpretation.
2Even if opinions are not expressed by words their representation usually contains abstract symbols,
i.e. ﬁgures or a meaningful position of the body.
3via a communication channel, thus creates an opinion. Second, the opinion has to be
transmitted as a message via a communication channel. The message received by the
communication partner is interpreted as a perceived opinion. The receiver decides on
the impact the other opinion has on its own attitude, i.e. whether she or he adopts the
opinion or not3. The adoption of an opinion implies the establishment of an equivalent
cognitive state, i.e. an attitude. Due to biases a perceived opinion can be diﬀerent from
the attitude that originally has been verbalised and transmitted.
Figure 1: Communication Model
Biases in these processes, i.e. an incomplete understanding of messages, and their im-
pact on the diﬀusion of information are issues for marketing communication research
(Trommsdorﬀ 1998, p. 283). Some of such biases analysed in consumer behaviour the-
ory are presented within the next subsection. The perceptual processes have got the
most attention by opinion dynamics researchers (and also in consumer behaviour the-
ory, see for example Shet et al. 1999). Therefore, we ﬁrst present the most important
basic concepts related to perceptual processes. Biases in transmission processes are not
considered. Then we develop a concept that captures biases in the verbalisation process.
For the concepts some ideas for simulation are given.
2.2 Biases in the perceptual process: selective exposure, selective at-
tention, and selective interpretation
Individuals are involved in many communications. To cope with the barrage of com-
munications and communication opportunities humans become ”selective” (Shet et al.
1999, pp 303-305). They ignore sources of information, hence communication opportu-
nities, they pay less attention to speciﬁc information, and they may bias the perceived
information.
Individuals tend to expose themselves to ideas that are in accordance with their inter-
est, needs, and existing attitudes (Rogers 1995, p. 164). Based on past experiences about
the content of speciﬁc sources this tendency to selective exposure leads to a selection of
communication opportunities. An individual has diﬀerent exposures to diﬀerent commu-
nication channels and sources; it will not talk to everybody with the same probability.
3The interpretation process and the adoption process are also referred to as perceptual processes.
4In several opinion dynamic models the selection of communication partners does not
depend on past experiences, but depends on the static membership to diﬀerent social
networks4 (e.g. Chattoe and Gilbert 1999, Deﬀuant et al. 2001, Deﬀuant et al. 2000,
Weisbuch et al. 2001). In the basic model of Deﬀuant et al. (2001), which we build on,
the communications are chosen arbitrarily.
If an agent receives information the source and the channel can lead to high or low at-
tention towards this information, i.e. selective attention. Individuals with high attention
may read a text completely but individuals with low attention stop after one or two
paragraphs. While processing the information this attention can increase or decrease. If
information is complex the selective attention inﬂuences the amount of information an
individual extracts from a message (Kroeber-Riel and Weinberg 1999).
Homophily is another concept that explains diﬀerent degrees of impact information have.
If the communication partners are homophile, i.e. are similar in their ideas and be-
haviours, then the communication is eﬃcient, thus the impact information have is higher
(Rogers 1995). Assuming that an agent pays high attention to information that is similar
to its own attitudes, selective attention may be modelled as a threshold that prevents an
adoption of information if it is not suﬃciently close to the own attitude. This concept is
a fundamental idea of models in Deﬀuant et al. (2001) and Weisbuch et al. (2001). Of
course the idea of threshold does not capture the idea of selective attention completely,
but the common assumption in opinion dynamic literature of atomic messages does not
support an incomplete perception of a message. It may be modelled such that low selec-
tive attention decreases the impact information has, which can be interpreted as taking
less information into account, hence adopting the other’s opinion incompletely.
Individuals have to decipher the message perceived from the communication channel.
Doing that individuals tend to interpret the information so as to conform to his or her
prior beliefs (Shet et al. 1999). If this eﬀect of selective interpretation refers to a general
perceptual distortion, as we assume, one should integrate a bias in the interpretation
process. This implies that the diﬀerence of the other agent’s opinion to the own attitude
is reduced, thus an adoption becomes more likely but the adopted information is biased.
The models presented in Deﬀuant et al. (2001) and Weisbuch et al. (2001) do not capture
such eﬀects.
If an individual has perceived one or more opinions it might adopt them. This means that
the own attitude is changed in a way that it becomes similar to the perceived opinion.
Usually the new information and the former attitude are weighted and the weights sum
up to one (e.g. Deﬀuant et al. 2001, Hegselmann and Krause 2002). Then the weight is
the impact an individual assigns to an opinion 5. It can depend on the selective attention
and exposure, hence on communication channel and communication partner as well as
on the content of the message, and on the own attitude.
4The membership of an individual in a speciﬁc social network determines the frequency or likelihood of
communication with other members of the same net, as well as the impact of the information transmitted
within the social net (e.g. Deﬀuant 2001). An agent can be part of several social nets.
5The impact is not included as a parameter that will be varied during the analysis.
52.3 Biases in verbalisation process: limited precision
The biases in perceptual processes are subject to several simulations and are basic to
consumer behaviour research. Biases in the process of verbalising attitudes, i.e. giving
opinions, is less elaborated.
To build up a successful, i.e. eﬃcient, communication the sender may take actions com-
pensating the biases at receiver’s side. To compensate the selective interpretation the
sender may use exaggeration. To avoid negative consequences of selective exposure or
selective attention the sender may shift its opinion intentionally towards the expected re-
ceivers opinion, like picking the receiver up where it is. Both, exaggeration and picking-up
bias the verbalisation process but are too complex to be integrated into a simple opinion
dynamics model.
The situation that sender and receiver share the same mind rarely occurs, hence both
have to use a communication channel, which in information diﬀusion models is very
often a symbolic or language based channel6(e.g. Kroeber-Riel and Weinberg 1999).
But human language applied by individuals usually covers only a limited number of
expressions7; hence the precision of attitude descriptions is limited. The sender does not
have simple mechanisms to avoid this.
There are some domains that make usage of attitude verbalisation. Marketing and so-
ciology researchers frequently ask people for their opinion (e.g. Shet et al. 1999 and
Kroeber-Riel and Weinberg 1999). If a perfect verbalisation, i.e. maximum precision,
was possible, then the researchers would probably apply such mechanisms. Instead, they
often employ scales that only have a few points (e.g. ﬁve or six points representing the
range from ”very bad” to ”very good”).
A restricted set of possible verbalisations cannot only be caused by the language limita-
tions but also be caused by social norms. In a management meeting or for a court order
it might not be acceptable to have more than two possible verbalisations (yes or no).
Because of language and social limitations the assumption of perfect verbalisation, as
done in many articles on opinion dynamics, has to be relaxed. Based on the concepts
presented in this section the next section develops a model of opinion dynamics, which
in fact should be called attitude dynamics, that extends the basic model presented in
Deﬀuant et al. (2001). Of course the basic model does not capture the state-of-the-art of
opinion dynamics but it is a useful starting point to introduce a new concept as limited
verbalisation capabilities. The basic model covers the concept of selective attention and
assumes arbitrary one-to-one communication between the individuals. The extensions
are related to selective interpretation, and more important, are related to biases in
verbalisation processes.
6Diﬀusion models describe attitudes and opinions usually as a number (see for instance in Deﬀuant
et al. 2001 and Deﬀuant 2001) and this number is communicated, thus a symbolic channel is used.
7Asking an individual for his or her opinion very common expressions are ”very good”, ”good”,
”neutral” or ”I do not know”, bad, and ”very bad”, representing the continuum from a very strong
tendency towards to a very weak tendency to react positively towards a given object.
63 Model
This section presents a model of attitude dynamics that captures the distinction of
attitude and opinion, as well as the biases caused by selective attention, by selective
interpretation, and by verbalisation restrictions. To keep the model simple concepts of
selective exposure related to select sources of information and communication partners
are not integrated. Finally, simulations should show how stable the properties derived
by Deﬀuant et al. (2001) are against verbalisation biases.
The model is based on a set of interacting agents8, i.e. a multi-agent system. There are N
agents, each maintaining an attitude xi. An attitude is a continuous variable between 0
and 1, inclusively. In each step of the simulation two arbitrary agents are selected9. These
two agents communicate their opinions, more precisely they verbalise their attitudes.
Both agents receive the other agent’s opinion and may adopt this perceived opinion,
thus modifying their current attitude x to create a new attitude x0.
Deﬁnition 1 The attitude x0
j of agent j in the next step is changed on the base of
the attitude xj of the current step and the four communication-related processes
that link agent j with agent i:
x0
j = adoptj (xj;interpretj (xj;transmission(verbalisei (xi))))
The processes ”interpret”, verbalise”, and ”adopt” are within sender or receiver while
the process ”transmission” is part of the environment. As each process works on diﬀerent
inputs and produces diﬀerent outputs these inputs and outputs are labelled and deﬁned
as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 Assuming agent i communicating its attitude to agent j we deﬁne:
attitude xi;xj
opinion oi = verbalisei (xi)
message mi = transmission(oi)
perceived opinion ˆ oi;j = interpretj (xj;mi)
new attitude x0
j = adoptj (xj; ˆ oi;j)
A prerequisite of communication about an attitude is verbalisation of the attitude, thus
formulating the opinion. Here we assume that agents have the ability to mark their
attitude on a scale from 0 to 1 with a given precision prec.
8The term agent refers to a formal representation of an individual. An analysis of agent paradigms
can be found in Gilbert and Troitzsch (1999), Conte et al. (1998), and Burkhard (1995).
9Selecting communication partners arbitrary across the whole society is a strong assumption. But as
we do not want to analyse the impact or the emergence of communication networks, this simpliﬁcation
emphasizes the focus on the impact of limited verbalisation capabilities.
7Figure 2: Values of opinion for a precision prec = 5.
The usage of a scale for verbalisation of an attitude implies that for each point on
the scale, referred to as a scale point, there is a related interval of attitudes that are
verbalised by this scale point. This interval is referred to as the scale point interval.
Figure 2 exempliﬁes scale points and their related scale point intervals for a precision
of 5. Except for the highest interval every interval includes its lower limit and excludes
its higher limit. The highest interval includes both, higher and lower limit. Deﬁnition 3
formalises this concept.
Deﬁnition 3 The verbalisation process is given by10:
oi = verbalisei (xi) =
(
bxi¢precic+0:5
preci if xi < 1
1 ¡ 1
2¢preci if xi = 1
The communication channel is assumed to be perfect, in fact it is assumed that the
receiver gets the message, as it is sent. Therefore, the transmission process is the identity.
Deﬁnition 4 The transmission process does not bias the message, hence the pro-
cess is given by identity: mi = transmission(oi) = oi
A message from agent i received by agent j has to be interpreted. This may cause
selective interpretation, which is a bias that leads to an interpretation that is closer to
the receiver’s attitude than the sender has intended to be. As this bias is absolute, there
are some messages that are interpreted to represent an opinion that is identical to the
own agent’s attitude.
Deﬁnition 5 The perceived opinion ˆ oi;j the agent j gets from the interpretation
process depends on the received message mi from agent i that is biased by selective
interpretation selij of agent j:




mi ¡ selij if mi > xj + selij
mi + selij if mi < xj ¡ selij
xj if jmi ¡ xjj 6 selij
When an agent has interpreted a message as the other agent’s opinion it can adopt
the perceived opinion. An adoption causes a change in the agent’s attitude towards the
perceived opinion. Selective attention causes a rejection of perceived opinions that are
10bxc means that x is rounded down while dxe means that x is rounded up to the next integer value.
8not suﬃciently close to the own attitude, thus it prevents the adoption. This is modelled
via a threshold selaj. The actual impact of the adoption on the the attitude is controlled
by the impact (impj). The higher the impact the more does the attitude change towards
the perceived opinion. The adoption process is deﬁned similar to Deﬀuant et al. (2001).
Deﬁnition 6 An adoption takes place with the impact (imp) if the perceived
opinion is not too far from the own attitude.
x0
j = adoptj (xj; ˆ oi;j) =
½
xj + impj (xj ¡ ˆ oi;j) if jxi ¡ ˆ oi;jj 6 selaj
xj if jxi ¡ ˆ oi;jj > selaj
4 Model Analysis
This section analyses properties of the model presented in the previous section. To derive
some hypotheses we introduce the concept of area of inﬂuential attitudes and how this is
inﬂuenced by the model’s parameters. To demonstrate the mechanisms we ﬁrst reproduce
results obtained by other authors; then we derive hypotheses about the eﬀects of biases
in the verbalisation process. Simulations are used to test these hypotheses. Of course we
cannot evaluate all properties of the model, but we will show some important features
mainly derived from an analysis keeping the other parameters constant.
The simulations used in this work contain one or more groups of agents. Agents in one
group diﬀer only in their initial attitude. A group is described by (num; seli; sela; imp;
prec; min; max), with num as the number of agents in the group. Parameters seli, sela,
imp, and prec are deﬁned as described in the model above. The initial attitudes of agents
in a group are equally distributed along the interval given by min and max.11.
4.1 Area of inﬂuential attitudes
The basic dynamic elements of the presented model are the communications between
the agents. The attitude formation depends on the fact whether the agent adopts the
perceived opinion or not. The more attitudes can inﬂuence an agent, the higher is the
probability of changes of its own attitude. And the smaller the range of adopted attitudes
is the smaller the range of the possible post-negotiation attitude.
To make the argumentation on the amount and value of inﬂuential attitudes more explicit
we introduce the concept of area of inﬂuential attitudes, which covers all attitudes that
may inﬂuence an agent. The area of inﬂuential attitudes depends on the agent’s attitude
11For example, ff8, 0.0, 0.5, 0.5, 5, 0, 1g,f2, 0.1, 0.5, 0.5, 5, 0.5, 0.7gg describes a multi-agent
system with all ten agents having selective attention of 0:5 and an impact of 0:5. They can verbalise
their attitudes on a ﬁve-point scale. The eight agents in the ﬁrst group have no selective interpretation,
while the two in the second group have that with a value of 0:1. The initial attitudes of the eight agents












7, and 1. The two agents from the second group get the
initial attitudes 0:5 and 0:7.
9x, on its properties, i.e. selective attention and selective interpretation, and on the other
agent’s precision while verbalising its attitude. If an agent has the maximum selective
attention (sela = 1), thus being very open-minded and not ignoring any other agent, and
if the agent has no bias caused by selective interpretation (seli = 0) and if the precisions
of the other agents are maximal (prec ! 1) then the area of inﬂuential attitudes covers
all possible attitudes from 0 to 1. Of course the area of inﬂuential attitudes is not equal
to the number of inﬂuential attitudes, but for our analysis it has proven to be a useful
tool12. The next paragraphs show how selective attention and selective interpretation
inﬂuence the area of inﬂuential attitudes; it partly reproduces well-known results. The
impact of precision is analysed in another section below.
Selective attention. Figure 3(a) marks the area of attitudes that are adopted under
the assumption of no selective interpretation (seli = 0) and a positive selective attention
(sela > 0). In contrast to attitude a1, attitude a2 is not adopted because it diﬀers too
much from the agent’s own attitude x. The higher the selective attention the larger is
the area of inﬂuential attitudes.
Figure 3: Area inﬂuential attitudes: (a) Due to selective attention an agent having the
attitude x adopts a1 but ignores a2. (b) Due to selective interpretation an agent having
the attitude x perceives the original a1 as a2 and the original a2 as being equal to x.
Both, a1 and a2 are adopted.
Selective Interpretation. Figure 3(b) demonstrates the case with positive selective
interpretation (seli > 0) and the same selective attention as in Figure 3(a). It can be
seen that the area is expanded compared with case (a) but close to the own attitude
x there is a white hole. This white area marks all attitudes that after verbalising and
transmitting are interpreted as representing the own attitude, thus causing no change
in the own attitude. The arrows express the fact that all inﬂuential attitudes are biased
during their verbalisation, transmission, and interpretation. Here for instance, attitude
a1 is interpreted as attitude a2, while a2 is treated as equal.
Precision. Consider one agent’s attitude, the impact of precision on the area of inﬂuen-
tial attitudes can be twofold. First, if a scale point is in the area of inﬂuential attitudes
12We can use the simple tool of area of inﬂuential attitudes only because we exclude every concept
that distinguishes agents by other attributes than the verbalised attitude.
10and the related scale point interval is partly outside, then the area is expanded. This
is due to the fact that the attitudes that are in the scale point interval but outside the
original area of inﬂuential attitudes are verbalised as being within the area. Second, if
the scale point interval is partly inside the area but the scale point is outside then the
area of inﬂuential attitudes is cut. If both, scale point and the related scale point in-
terval, are outside or both are within the original area of inﬂuential attitudes the area
is not inﬂuenced by this scale point. Figure 4 exempliﬁes the expansion as well as the
reduction; in this case the overall eﬀect is an expansion of the area of inﬂuential atti-
tudes leading to the known eﬀects on fragmentation. Because these eﬀects depend on the
attitude an agent has, the impact of scale points on the area of inﬂuential attitudes can
be diﬀerent for several agents. The arrows in Figure 4 mark the fact that, as in the case
of selective interpretation, the inﬂuential attitudes are biased while they are verbalised,
transmitted, and interpreted; here they are biased by verbalisation, they are set to the
corresponding scale point.
The next subsections apply the concept of area of inﬂuential attitudes to derive dynamic
properties of the model presented in this article.
Figure 4: Area of inﬂuential attitudes and precision: Due to the ﬁnite precision an agent
having the attitude x perceives attitude a1 and a2 as s1 and a3 as s2. Contrary to inﬁnite
precision a1 now inﬂuences the agent and a3 does not.
4.2 Selective attention
After introducing the idea of the area of inﬂuential attitudes we will analyse the patterns
of the system’s dynamics concerning changes of selective attention keeping selective in-
terpretation zero (seli = 0) and having the same selective attention and impact rate imp
for all agents. Then we weaken the assumption and allow diﬀerent selective attentions
for diﬀerent agents.
A communication between two agents, which leads to an adoption of a perceived opinion
by at least one agent, results in an attitude conﬁguration where both agents’ attitudes
are closer to each other than before. In combination with an upper and lower limit of
11the range of attitudes and many agents an inﬁnite number of randomly chosen commu-
nications will lead to a stable conﬁguration. Such a stable conﬁguration is characterised
by the fact that for each communication in this conﬁguration either both attitudes are
perceived as being equal or an adoption is prevented by the selective attention.
Within a stable conﬁguration one can identify clusters. Clusters are disjunctive sets of
agents such that each agent has only agents in its own set whose perceived opinion is
not ignored due to a too big diﬀerence to the own attitude. In other words, all agents
that have attitudes in the area of inﬂuential attitudes of another agent are in the same
cluster as this agent.
Homogeneous societies. For homogeneous societies with agents that only diﬀer in
their initial attitude, the description of a stable conﬁguration gives the maximum number
of clusters of attitudes as in proposition 1, i.e. how many diﬀerent attitudes are present
in the stable conﬁguration. Proposition 1 utilises the fact that between two clusters there
has to be at least a diﬀerence of sela + ", else an agent from one cluster can adopt a
perceived opinion from another cluster, which then means that the clusters by deﬁnition
have not been clusters13.
Proposition 1 For many agents (N ! 1), assuming for every agent an in-
ﬁnite precision and no selective interpretation (seli = 0) the maximal number








The smaller the selective attention is, the smaller is the area of inﬂuential attitudes
and the less adoptions can take place. Thus more clusters of attitudes can evolve. The
number of attitudes actually inﬂuencing an agent depends on the initial distribution
and on the sequence of communications. To reach the maximum number it needs very
speciﬁc communication patterns and speciﬁc conﬁgurations of initial attitudes14. For a
random distribution and random patterns of communication Deﬀuant et al. (2001) derive
the mean number of clusters as in proposition 1. The occasion of getting the maximum
number is less likely the more agents are in the system.
Heterogeneous societies. In a heterogeneous scenario, when agents have diﬀerent
selective attentions, one can observe pseudo stable conﬁgurations. Pseudo stable conﬁg-
urations are conﬁgurations that have a large subset of agents that is stable. This means
that only very few agents are the reason for further dynamics. Therefore the dynamics
are slowly and seldom. If the number of agents with high values of selective attentions is
relatively small, then in the short run the low values determine the clustering, but in the
long run it collapses to the clusters according to the high values of selective attention.
Figure 5(b) shows the case of a heterogeneous society. One open-minded agent inﬂuences
13The symbol " is a very small value that has to be integrated because the area of inﬂuential attitudes
includes its limits.
14For example, the initial conﬁguration of two relatively open-minded agents (sela = 0:9) that have
the extreme initial attitudes 0:05 and 0:95 leads to two stable clusters, which is above the expected
number of clusters (1).
12the narrow-minded agents such that they step-by-step get closer and ﬁnally collapse into
one attitude. Figure 5(a) shows that the open-minded agent (agent 20) has the widest
range of attitudes adopted during the simulation. Deﬀuant et al. 2000, Weisbuch et al.
2001 and Hegselmann and Krause 2002 obtain similar results.
Proposition 2 For many agents (N ! 1), assuming for every agent an inﬁnite
precision and no selective interpretation (seli = 0) as well as heterogeneous se-
lective attentions (selai 6= selak > 0) the maximal number of clusters of attitudes
















Figure 5: Dynamics with heterogeneous selective attentions: (a) shows all attitudes each
of the 20 agents adopts during the simulation run, while (b) shows the sequential sim-
ulation run. Contrary to agents 1 to 19 that are narrow-minded with an equally small
selective attention, agent 20 is open-minded, i.e. has a higher selective attention.
4.3 Selective Interpretation
The results related to the selective attention are common ground in articles about opinion
dynamics, but what about selective interpretation. As shown above selective interpreta-
tion modiﬁes the area of inﬂuential attitudes and as we have seen this area signiﬁcantly
inﬂuences the fragmentation of attitudes. Because a positive selective interpretation ex-
pands the area of inﬂuential attitudes one gets a smaller expected number and also a
smaller maximum number of clusters. Because attitudes that diﬀer slightly from the own
attitude are perceived as being equal one can also expect that the clusters do not collapse
into one value but cover a range of attitudes. The range, referred to as the cluster range,
depends on the value of selective interpretation and is given as 2 ¢ seli. The proposition
1 can be extended as in proposition 3.
13Proposition 3 For many agents (N ! 1), assuming for every agent an in-
ﬁnite precision and a positive selective interpretation (seli > 0) the maximal











Figures 6(c) and (d) present simulation runs that show the predicted behaviour. The
clusters do not converge completely. In (c) one can see a tendency to fewer clusters; only
by chance one agent survived as a third cluster. The expansion of the area of inﬂuential
attitudes should also increase the likelihood of adoption and hence decreasing the time
until stable conﬁgurations emerge. This is easy to see by comparing the time axes of (b)
and (d).
Figure 6: Zero and positive selective interpretation with homogeneous and heterogeneous
selective attentions: (a) is a simulation run with 20 agents that only diﬀer in their initial
attitude, but all have no selective interpretation, a selective attention of 0:16, and an
impact rate of 0:4. Simulation run (b) is the same as (a) but with one agent being open-
minded, i.e. having a selective attention of 0:4 (see also Figure 5). Simulation run (c) is
the same as (a) but with a selective interpretation of 0:05. Simulation run (d) changes
(c) such that there is one open-minded agent as in (b).
144.4 Precision
This section will analyse the eﬀect of diﬀerent precisions while agents verbalise their
attitudes. For simpliﬁcation the analysis is restricted to cases with no selective interpre-
tation, but based on the insights about the impact of selective interpretation on the area
of inﬂuential attitudes it is easily extendable.
As agents are forced to verbalise their attitudes as opinions and both do not have to be
identical, an agent might adopt a perceived opinion that diﬀers more from the own at-
titude than the other agent’s attitude actually does. This can lead to the over adoption
which has occurred when two agents communicate and an agents pre-communication
attitude xi shifts over the attitude aj of another agent to the post-communication atti-
tude x0
i. This eﬀect is speciﬁc for biases in verbalisation processes. An example can be
seen in Figure 7(d). The same ﬁgure also shows a consequence of over adoption, there
are conﬁgurations that result in ﬁnal attitudes for all agents that are above the highest
initial attitude.
Proposition 4 For a ﬁnite precision (prec < 1) the initial order of attitudes
of agents involved in a communication can be inversed after the communication.
For the whole agent society the eﬀects of the verbalisation restriction is diﬃcult to
analyse. This is mainly due to the strong dependency on the initial attitude distribution
and on the communication sequence. For simpliﬁcation we distinguish three important
scenarios and assume an equal distribution of attitudes among many agents. Additionally
we give the attitude distribution leading to the most extreme eﬀect, i.e. the maximum
number of clusters15.
Scenario I: Low precision. The ﬁrst scenario represents the cases such that at the
beginning each agent has at most one scale point in its area of inﬂuential attitudes. This
can be represented by the condition prec 6 b1=(2 ¢ sela)c.
If the scale has only a small number of scale points, then the smaller the selective
attention is the more agents experience a cut of their area of inﬂuential attitudes. This
leads to a high number of clusters. In fact, there are agents in this scenario between
two scale points that have an empty area of inﬂuential attitudes. These agents will
not change their attitude at all, even if they talk with an agent having an attitude
very close to their own. The other agent is forced to verbalise its attitude as a scale
point far away. Therefore the maximal number of clusters equals the number of agents,
especially if all agents have an initial attitude outside the areas that are set by scale
point plus/minus selective attention around each scale point. To get the average number
we take into account that in average prec¢b2 ¢ sela ¢ Nc agents lie within such areas and
build clusters according to the scale points. The other agents are not inﬂuenced, hence
being a cluster itself (see proposition 5).
15The minimum number of clusters is 1 for all cases, especially in the case of all agents having the
same initial attitude.
15Figure 7: (a), (b), and (c) represent the three important scenarios for the analysis of the
impact of precision: low, medium, and high precision. The setting of all three simulation
runs is: 20 agents, no selective interpretation, a medium selective attention of 0:16666,
and an impact rate of 0:4. Precision prec is 2 in (a), 5 in (b), and 8 in (c). Simulation
run (d) exempliﬁes over adoption.
16In scenario I every agent has at most one scale point in its area of inﬂuential attitudes.
Therefore an agent changes its attitude in one and only one direction or it does not change
it at all. This leads to an easy way to calculate all attitudes an agent might adopt during
a simulation run. An agent can only form attitudes that are in the range between its
initial attitude and its attitude in the ﬁnal stable conﬁguration. The latter is given by
the scale point it has in its area of inﬂuential attitudes. Proposition 5 summarises the
results for scenario I.
Proposition 5 For many agents (N ! 1) assuming a low precision (prec 6
b1=(2 ¢ sela)c), no selective interpretation (seli = 0), and a positive selective
attitude (sela > 0):
– The maximal number of clusters of attitudes is N.
– The expected number of clusters is prec + N ¡ prec ¢ b2 ¢ sela ¢ Nc.
– For every step from x to x0 the diﬀerence x ¡ x0 has the same sign or equals
zero (shift the attitude only in one direction).
– For every scale point s the diﬀerence s ¡ x has for every simulation step the
same sign or equals zero (no crossing of scale points).
– If x¡o(x) > sela, with x as the attitude of an agent and o(x) as its verbalised
attitude, then the agent will never adopt a perceived opinion (some agents
might never adopt another attitude).
– If x ¡ o(x) 6 sela, with x as the attitude of an agent and o(x) as its verbalised
attitude, then the attitudes the agent adopts during the simulation are within
the interval [x;o(x)].
Figure 7(a) shows a simulation run that ﬁts to scenario I. Proposition 5 predicts a number
of ten clusters, which is exactly the number as reached in simulation16. One can also see
that every agent moves only into one direction.
Scenario II: Medium precision. Due to a very low precision in the ﬁrst scenario
every agent has at most one scale point in its area of inﬂuential attitudes. Inequality
b1=(2 ¢ sela)c < prec 6 b1=selac is the assumption of the second scenario, which repre-
sents the fact that every agent has at least one and at most two scale points in its area
of inﬂuential attitudes. Additionally, if an agent has an attitude close to a scale point,
it has exactly one scale point in its area of inﬂuential attitudes. The meaning of close is
determined by being less than sela ¡ 1=(2 ¢ prec). If this diﬀerence becomes very small
then the probability of coming suﬃciently close to a scale point is very small, hence
the probability of many agents with oscillating attitudes increases. As the number of
oscillating agents increases when selective attention increases or precision decreases such
changes increase the time taken until a stable conﬁguration may be reached. As we will
see later this is not the only reason why a convergence might be delayed.
Because every agent has a scale point in its area of inﬂuential attitudes and for many
agents with equally distributed initial attitudes there are agents for each scale point that
have only this one in their area of inﬂuential attitudes the maximum number of clusters
16In Figure 7(a) there is one data line identical with the time axis.
17and the expected number is the same and equals prec. The simulation run presented in
Figure 7(b) supports this. The same ﬁgure also shows that agents can move into two
directions but do not cross a scale point.
Proposition 6 For many agents (N ! 1), assuming a medium precision
(b1=(2 ¢ selai)c < prec < b1=selaic), no selective interpretation (seli = 0), and a
positive selective attitude (sela > 0):
– The maximal number of clusters of attitudes as well as the expected number
of clusters is given by the precision.
– For every simulation step the diﬀerence of any scale point and an agent’s
attitude has the same sign or equals zero. If it equals zero then this holds
forever (no crossing of scale points).
– If the area of inﬂuential attitudes of the agent’s initial attitude covers only
one scale point then the range of possibly formed attitudes of this agent is
between its initial attitude and its verbalisation.
– If the area of inﬂuential attitudes of the agent’s initial attitude covers two
scale points s1 and s2 (s1 < s2) and it converges to sj with j 2 f1;2g
then the range of possibly adopted attitudes is given by the following inter-
val [min(sj;s2 ¡ sela);max(sj;s1 + sela)].
Scenario III: High precision. The third scenario assumes a high precision, thus it
includes the case with inﬁnite precision. Because the area of inﬂuential attitudes can
cover many scale points, in fact at least two (even if it is at a scale point), an agent’s
attitude changes do not have to have a unique direction. The same reason leads to the
occasion that agents’ attitudes can cross scale points, which is intuitive, especially in the
case of inﬁnite precision. Therefore, the range of attitudes that can be adopted by an
agent during a simulation run cannot easily be determined based on selective attention,
impact, and selective interpretation, as can be done in scenario I and II.
As this scenario covers the case of inﬁnite precision and the proposition 1 only depends
on a suﬃcient high precision, the mean and maximum number of clusters is the same
as in proposition 1 (see Figure 7(c)). Simulations have demonstrated that this result
depends heavily on the fact that there are many agents with initial attitudes that are
equally distributed over the range of possible attitudes. The smaller the number of agents
is, the higher the probability of getting more than the predicted number of clusters.
Proposition 7 For many agents (N ! 1), assuming high precision b1=selac 6
prec < 1, no selective interpretation (seli = 0), and a positive selective attitude
(sela > 0), proposition 1 holds.
In scenarios II and III attitude changes do not have a unique direction. Together with
the eﬀect of over adoption one can observe a cyclic over adoption. A cyclic over adop-
tion for two agents describes the following eﬀect. Two agents communicate their pre-
communication attitudes and adopt the perceived opinions. Due to limited precision over
18adoption happens. Although the agents do not adopt the other agent’s opinion com-
pletely they over adopt due to verbalisation biases. This leads to a post-communication
attitude that is similar to the partner’s pre-communication attitude. If this over adoption
happens for both agents the agents switch their positions. Every next communication
does the same. Figure 8 shows a simulation run exemplifying cyclic over adoption. The
cyclic over adoption is not restricted to two agents. Similar eﬀects can be observed with
many agents. Cyclic over adoption can prevent a stable conﬁguration.
Because the parameter impact (imp) determines the degree of adoption, i.e. the diﬀerence
that an agent moves towards the other agent, the cyclic over adoption eﬀect also depends
on this parameter. The area that is crossed during cyclic over adoption decreases while
the impact becomes smaller.
Agents participating in a cyclic over adoption express diﬀerent opinions along the time.
Therefore such a speciﬁc conﬁguration can prevent or delay stable conﬁgurations and
they can be pseudo stable for ever.
Figure 8: Cyclic over adoption: Simulation run with two agents, both without selective
interpretation, both adopting every perceived opinion, both assigning an impact of 0:3
to perceived opinions, but each with another initial attitude.
4.5 Precision and the number of clusters
The presented results for diﬀerent precisions show that there is no one single rule for the
number of clusters one can expect, even if the number of agents is assumed to be very
high and if the initial attitudes are equally distributed. Figure 9 shows approximately
how the number of clusters depends on the precision.
4.6 Precision and selective interpretation
Although this article only analyses the eﬀects of changes in a single model parameter Fig-
ure 10 shows some simulation runs with positive selective interpretation, small selective
attention and several degrees of precision.
19Figure 9: Number of clusters depending on precision for an inﬁnite number of agents
with equally distributed initial attitudes. The dotted line marks the maximal number of
clusters in a stable conﬁguration.
Figures 10(a) and (b) demonstrate a behaviour that is compatible with previous ﬁnd-
ings. Low precision leads to the expected number of clusters but the range of the clusters
is inﬂuenced by selective interpretation. In 10(c) one can see that some attitudes oscil-
late between two scale points. The positive selective interpretation prevents a complete
convergence to the scale points and it biases the scale points towards the agent’s atti-
tude. Hence, in this case, the agents continuously have two scale points in their area
of inﬂuential attitudes, thus oscillating between both scale points. In 10(d) one can see
a simulation run that shows another interesting characteristic. No agent adopts a scale
point as its attitude, but their attitudes converge at the limits of the range of attitudes,
which they had perceived as equal if they would adopt the scale point. The simulation
run presented in Figure 10(e) seems to combine these eﬀects. Simulation runs with a
precision of at least d1=selae show the same patterns as with an inﬁnite precision, as
presented in Figure 10 (f).
5 Conclusion
The previous sections have presented a model and its analysis that captures communi-
cation-related concepts from consumer behaviour literature, i.e. selective interpretation,
selective attention and attitude verbalisation processes. In consumer behaviour literature
the attitude verbalisation process is not deeply anticipated and in opinion dynamic
models its is rarely addressed. But the model analysis has shown that especially for the
case of medium precision the impact on opinion dynamics is signiﬁcant and should be
explored more detailed. Because opinion leaders and multipliers, e.g. mass media and
consulting institutions, can choose the scale that they express their attitudes on, the
results of this article are interesting for practitioners, too.
Scenario II, which assumes a precision such that at least one but at most two scale
points are in the area of inﬂuential attitudes, seems to be very interesting. This scenario
20Figure 10: Limited precision and selective interpretation: Each simulation run is with
20 agents having a selective interpretation of 0:05, a selective attention of 0:16, and an
impact of perceived opinions of 0:4. The simulations runs diﬀer in the value of precision:
(a) prec = 2, (b) prec = 3, (c) prec = 4, (d) prec = 5, (e) prec = 6, and (f) prec = 8.
21shows patterns that contradict the ﬁndings of Deﬀuant et al. (2001) and Weisbuch et al.
(2001). The number of clusters is signiﬁcantly higher than predicted by those authors.
Additionally one can see that in combination with selective interpretation medium pre-
cision shows complex fragmentation patters (see Figures 10 (c)-(f)), which base on the
over adoption eﬀect and the resulting cyclic over adoption.
Cyclic over adoption as demonstrated in Figure 8 does not seem to be intuitive for human
behaviour. Individuals may develop mechanisms that prevent such cyclic behaviour.
These mechanisms should be explored in more detail.
The analysis in this article only investigates the isolated impact of one model parameter
but does not analyse the combination of them. Figure 10 shows by example simulations
that complex dynamic patterns can arise if selective interpretation and limited preci-
sion is coupled. After these ﬁrst impressions and results that justify additional eﬀort,
one should further improve the model and the tools of analysis, i.e. area of inﬂuential
attitudes.
If the model and analysis is mature then one can extend the model to capture more
concepts that are relevant for marketing research, for instance Mowen and Minor (1998)
state that consumers overemphasise negative signals in mouth-to-mouth communication.
Also strategic biases by the sender, that are intended to prevent biases by the receiver,
may be integrated into the model.
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